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Making and Keeping the Peace: An Analysis of African Union Efficacy
Nicholas Temple
ABSTRACT
The African Union (AU) has pledged to create a continent of peace and
solidarity. However, dozens of socio-ethnic conflicts occur across the continent
despite the AU’s best efforts to prevent them. In this thesis, case studies of
Darfur and Western Sahara were used to assess the efficacy of the AU in the
realm of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Within each of these studies, AU
impediments to peacemaking and peacekeeping on financial, political, and sociocultural fronts were analyzed. The findings suggest that while socio-cultural
conflict continues to proliferate, the AU has neither the financial resources nor
the political clout to meet peacemaking and peacekeeping milestones.
Furthermore, findings from this research suggest that conflict founded upon
socio-cultural diversity undermines the very foundation of regionalism solidarity
and therefore compromises the overall application of regionalism as a
mechanism for peacekeeping. This in turn stymies the AU from becoming
internationally respected for making and keeping the peace.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Since decolonization of Africa, the power struggle within and between
African governments has resulted in civil unrest and interstate warfare. These
conflicts have been the target of peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives of
the Western powers, the United Nations (UN), and neighboring African states.
The European Union (EU) has found regionalism to be a preventative solution to
conflict. After two world wars, European states used economic interdependence
and political integration to establish the EU as a forum to negotiate and mediate
issues across a table instead of on a battlefield. With the success Europe has
experienced in quelling violence and civil unrest through regionalism, many hope
this interdependence of states through regional integration has may be a
possible remedy for African turbulence.
This thesis seeks to evaluate the efficacy of Africa’s response to
regionalism, in particular the African Union (AU), and its peacemaking and
peacekeeping efforts in Darfur and Western Sahara. It will examine questions
stemming from three quintessential areas of AU peacemaking and
peacekeeping: economical, political, and socio-cultural. Why is the AU having
financial problems? If the purpose of peacekeeping is to broker peace through
compromise between opposing parties, is it within the interest of member states
1

that are the subject to peacekeeping measures to contribute state funds to the
AU Peace Fund? Why do Governments such as Sudan and Morocco object to
the intervention of UN peacekeeping forces while inviting an AU peacekeeping
mission? Is AU peacekeeping more acceptable because of its African origin, or
is it because of its widespread record of lame-duck peacekeeping missions that
offer little threat to the offending government? This study will attempt to address
these questions within two case studies of Darfur and Western Sahara.

Methodology
Through the use of primary sources such as UN and AU publications and
secondary sources such as periodicals, books, articles, and newspapers, I will
address the issue of AU peacemaking and peacekeeping efficacy by analyzing
two case studies: the Darfur crisis and the Western Sahara stalemate. The
analysis will focus on whether or not economic, political, and cultural factors have
stymied AU peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in these two distinct African
regions.

Case Study Analysis
The Darfur and Western Sahara conflicts were chosen for analysis due to
their high level of AU involvement and therefore offer sufficient evidence of AU
peacemaking and peacekeeping capabilities. Other crises, such as Congo and
2

Rwanda were subject to more outside peacemaking and peacekeeping
assistance rather than driven by a high level of AU involvement. Furthermore,
cases such as Liberia and Sierra Leone are more of an example of the
peacekeeping efforts of sub-regional organizations such as the Economic
Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). The Darfur and Western
Sahara case studies, however, offer sufficient data for greater understanding of
the AU peacemaking machine due to the AU’s deep involvement in each of these
conflicts. Moreover, the comparison of the two cases will offer a more balanced
understanding of the AU’s capacity for peacemaking and peacekeeping as a
whole.

Conceptual Clarifications
Understanding the difference between peacemaking and peacekeeping
are integral to the evaluation of AU conflict resolution because the benchmarks
towards peace outlined within each approach will be used as a measure for
efficacy evaluation. Because this thesis will evaluate how effective the AU can
meet the goals of peacemaking and peacekeeping, it is important to first define
these and other terms for clarification and understanding.
Richmond (2002) defines conflict in a multilateral context wherein the
definition involves the interjecting agendas of human rights, sovereignty, territory,
self-determination, and identity that result in conflicting ethnic groups and
nationalities. For the purposes of this thesis, conflict will be defined as an
3

occurrence whereby two or more groups are engaged in a struggle founded on
contradicting agendas.
Peacemaking has been defined as the proactive intervention to encourage
warring factions to settle their dispute (Conteh-Morgan, 2004). For the purposes
of this study, peacemaking will be defined as the use of both non-military and
military interventions as a means to achieve cessation of open hostilities.
Peacekeeping has been used as a blanket terminology to incorporate
other approaches to used to achieve peace such as peace-building,
peacemaking, peace enforcement, and preventative diplomacy (Conteh Morgan,
2002; Diehl, 1993). Peacekeeping has also been defined simply as the use of
military intervention to maintain peace and prevent an increase in confrontation
(Conteh-Morgan 2004). Kieh and Mukenge (2002) define the traditional
peacekeeping approach as the use of military force and political pressure by a
third party to maintain the peace achieved by the peacemaking process. Diehl
(1993) has defined peacekeeping as “any international effort involving an
operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the
resolution of longstanding disputes” (p. 4), while Goulding (1993) defines it as a
technique set up to help settle armed conflicts. Lastly, the UN Charter (October
1945) Chapter XII, Article 41 states, “The Security Council may decide what
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect
to its decisions…”. For the purpose of this study, peacekeeping is defined as the
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act of maintaining and sustaining peace through the use of military intervention
forces.
Mediation is an international engagement where a third-party will convene
at the negotiating table with warring parties and employ diplomatic methods to
help both parties reach a peaceful resolution (Goulding, 1993). Wall, Stark, and
Standifer (2001) agree with this definition that mediation is when a third-party
intercedes between two opposing forces. However, they add that this third-party
may or may not have the authority to compel an outcome of the warring parties.
Taking these definitions into account, mediation in this thesis s defined as the
intercession of a third-party to facilitate the resumption of communication
between two or more conflicting groups to achieve a resolution through
compromise.
In addition, financial impediments to peace are those obstacles, financial
in nature, which obstruct the proliferation of peacekeeping endeavors. Political
impediments are those hurdles peacekeepers face which stem from the use of
rules, alliances, and other political devices to obstruct the progression of
peacekeeping endeavors. Socio-Cultural impediments are obstacles born
through circumstances that involve conflicting groups whereby the source of
conflict is ethnic, cultural, or societal by nature.
Because this thesis evaluates how well the AU engages in peacemaking
and peacekeeping, the dictionary defines the term efficacy as “the power to
produce an effect” (Morehead & Morehead, 2009). Therefore, AU efficacy will be
5

defined as the AU’s ability to meet peacemaking and peacekeeping goals
wherein peace is attained and sustained. For the purposes of this thesis, the
goals for peacemaking are,
•

To halt hostilities through the attainment and continuance of ceasefire;

The goals for peacekeeping are;
•

To bring warring parties to the negotiations table;

•

To Facilitate negotiation whereby both parties are likely to maintain
peaceful relations over time; and

•

To maintain peace longevity amongst the populace.

Literature Review
Peacekeeping as a general concept has evolved over time, incorporating
a wide scope of approaches and philosophies over the course of the twentieth
century through today.

Cold War to Post-Cold War: The Evolution of Peacekeeping
During the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were quite simplified.
Richmond (2002) states that the balance of power that is characteristic of the
state-centered Realpolitik philosophy created a background for much of the UN
peacekeeping polices. He states that this international backdrop lays the
foundation for the first of three generations of peacekeeping. Because the first
6

generation is state-centered, it primarily focused upon a state-centered approach
wherein a conflict is stifled by the efforts of an outside source and sought to
maintain the balance of power through the maintenance of hostility cessation.
Furthermore, Diehl (1993) covers several cases wherein the U.N. had many
peacekeeping operations between 1955 and 1992 that obliged the peacekeepers
to maintain the target of peacekeeping operations to reside at the state level.
The second generation flies in the face of the state-centrism of its
predecessor. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift in the
peacekeeping paradigm from the use of force to intercede within conflicts to the
use of conflict resolution methods (Bandura, 1982; Diehl, 1994; Wall and
Druckman, 2003). The conflict resolution theories of the second generation
according to Richmond (2002), are centered upon the individual and therefore
stress that a peace agreement cannot be achieved until the consent and
consideration of the rank-and-file is considered.
In response to this shift, three main approaches to obtaining peace have
been developed. These new approaches, including peace enforcement,
preventive diplomacy, and peace-building (Conteh-Morgan, 2004), offered a
significant paradigm shift in peacekeeping methods. Because of the shift these
peacekeeping approaches represent, they have been labeled as a “third
generation” of peacekeeping by Richmond (2002). This change is marked by
peacekeeping operations of the UN from a stance of “interposition” in which highprofile levels of mediation and negotiation exist, to that of “integrated and
7

multidimensional operations” marked by the peace enforcement operations for
which the UN was later to be known (Richmond, 2002, p. 11). He states that this
generation of peacekeeping “approaches [to] peace…signify the attempt to
create an operational, normative, just, democratic fabric of mediation in and
between civil societies” (Richmond, 2002, p. 11-12).
A closer look at peace enforcement will offer evidence of this paradigm
shift. Peace enforcement is based on the access the peace enforcer has to the
necessary material and personnel to encourage compliance of the disgruntled
parties. The peace enforcer must be of a neutral party and they “must
demonstrate…willingness to induce compliance from all of the parties to the
conflict, without exception. [The willingness to induce compliance] is critical for
establishing the enforcer’s credibility with both the disputants and the
international community at large” (Kieh & Mukenge, 2002, p. 17). It is important
for the peace enforcer to be knowledgeable of political, as well as social,
economic, and cultural aspects of the conflicted region, as this knowledge is
crucial to peace enforcement (Kieh & Mukenge, 2002). The recognition of these
other aspects towards conflict demonstrates the major paradigm shift within
peacekeeping as a whole.
Another addition to peacekeeping operations is the use of preventive
diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy is the employment of diplomatic measures to
arrest conflict before it can proliferate (Conteh-Morgan, 2004). Furthermore,
Murray (2001) argues that much of conflict outburst stems from human rights
8

violations. She continues to add that if human rights violations were
diplomatically addressed early, conflict could be preempted. Amnesty
International (1998) agrees stating a clear link between the preservation of
human rights and the minimization of conflict.
Peace-building has become more common since the end of the Cold War
as a potential replacement for peacekeeping (Shimizu and Sandler, 2002).
Rather than rely on a military presence to induce compliance, peace-building
focuses more on the rebuilding of infrastructure and establishing a transparent
government as a means of maintaining peace (Conteh-Morgan, 2004).
Furthermore, Samuels (2005) believes that a lasting peace is contingent upon
three interrelated aspects to building democratic governance:
•

The society is transitioned from the utilization of violence to political
means of settling conflict;

•

There is a reformation of governance that ensures equity amongst warring
parties and the development of democratic governance;

•

There is an establishment of sustainable, meaningful institutions.

In agreement, Adedeji (1999) believes it is important to understand the complex
dynamic of African conflict; he states that sustainable peace is found in good
governance, democracy, and development.
As presented, peacekeeping has evolved from simply focusing upon the
solution to conflict at the state level to emphasizing the individual, cultural,
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economic factors. Furthermore, there is also a movement by states within the
developed world to share the peacekeeping burden.

Regionalism’s Role in Conflict Pacification
Regionalism has become a growing trend in international politics as well
as international economics. In the realm of peacekeeping, the UN and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have taken the lead to initiate peacekeeping
operations in many conflicts worldwide. Furthermore, many regions of the world
are aiming to follow the path of the EU as they watched the European Coal and
Steal Community evolve into the world’s largest single market economy, as well
as bring a region that was the epicenter of two world wars to over 50 years of
peace (Dinan, 2003). Discussing the peacekeeping examples of each of these
noteworthy organizations in brief offers an opportunity for understanding context
and the lessons learned within the world of peacekeeping operations by
international organizations.
The UN has been the international figurehead for peacekeeping
operations. Its evolution of peacekeeping methods since its conception illustrate
the very change in peacekeeping over time as stated in Richmond (2002).
According to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations within the UN:
The nature of conflicts has also changed over the years. Originally
developed as a means of dealing with inter-State conflict, UN
peacekeeping has been increasingly applied to intra-State conflicts and
civil wars. Although the military remain the backbone of most
peacekeeping operations, the many faces of peacekeeping now include
administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, de10

miners and electoral observers, human rights monitors and specialists in
civil affairs and governance, humanitarian workers and experts in
communications and public information.
(UN, 2008b)

This evolution can be seen when comparing the mandates of United Nations
Operation in the Congo in 1960 (ONUC) with that of the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda in 1993-1995 (UNAMIR) (UN, 2008d). Within the
Congolese operation, there was a short mandate speaking of installing a
ceasefire by offering the Government of the Republic of the Congo military
assistance to help quell the intrastate violence (United Nations, 2008c). By
contrast, UNAMIR offers a much more multifaceted approach to peacekeeping.
UNAMIR’s mandate was to monitor the ceasefire in addition to the distribution of
humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the UNAMIR mandate stated that peacekeepers
were to:
Stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda to encourage
the return of the displaced population; provide security and support for
humanitarian assistance…; and to promote, through mediation and good
offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.
(United Nations, UNAMIR, 2008).
Furthermore, in International Peacekeeping, Diehl (1993) comments on
the UN peacekeeping missions in the past 50 years, highlighting 10 such
operations. One in particular, UN Emergency Force-I (UNEF I), the United
Nation’s first peacekeeping mission to the Suez Canal in 1956, offers evidence
noteworthy of future peacekeeping trends. Despite UNEF I achieving its first two
goals of arresting conflict and facilitating the withdrawal of Israeli, French, and
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British troops from the area, the withdrawal of UN troops at the request of Egypt’s
President Nasser offered Israel an opportunity for a preemptive strike against
Arab forces near its borders. The Six-Day War subsequently ensued. According
to Diehl (1993), this occurred because UNEF I failed to extinguish the source of
Arab-Israeli conflict. UNEF I offers an example of first generational
peacekeeping of which Richmond (2002) speaks, concentrating upon a solution
at the state level by arresting violence without addressing the underlying sources
of the conflict. Furthermore, the respect for state borders the UN offers within its
charter is suspect to Richmond’s (2002) first generational peacekeeping theory
as well. According to Goulding (1993), “… [UN] peacekeeping operations could
be set up only with the consent of the parties to the conflict in question” (1993, p.
454). The UNEF I operation illustrates the underlying reasons for the change in
peacekeeping ideology between ONUC and UNAMIR.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is another example of
peacekeeping by a regional organization. Created during the Cold War as an
allied response to a perceived growing communist threat world wide, NATO
came to represent the West’s counterbalance to the Soviet heavyweight. After
the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union, many expected that NATO would
dissipate without its adversarial mandate; yet it has become a major player in
regional security operations in the post-Cold War world (Duffield, 1994; Solana,
1999). Evidence of this can be seen in NATO’s most recent success in their
intervention within the Kosovo conflict (Solana, 1999). However, Dobbins (2005)
12

states that NATO lacks the same resources as the UN and the EU to cover those
functions that stem beyond military intervention which this new age of
peacekeeping requires.
Due to European solidarity, EU peacekeeping efforts have stemmed
outward with moderate success. The creation of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (EMP) is a demonstration of this fact through its use of market
liberalization techniques to maintain peace.

Young (2003) covers at length the

EMP goals of political, economic, and social stability through promoting
economic, political, and social union with EU policies. Young (2003) describes
the peacekeeping and security goals of the EMP as alleviating socioeconomic
factors within the area by establishing a free-trade area by 2010. This
peacekeeping initiative is set forth between the EU and South Mediterranean
states including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian
Authority, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey. This “zone of interest and stability” is
criticized for being counter-productive because it opens these underdeveloped
markets to EU competition, which threatens to destabilize the region (Young,
2003, p. 414-416). As seen through the example of NAFTA’s effect upon Central
American countries, peacemaking and peacekeeping through liberalization of
markets may very well backfire as businesses are forced to compete with the
competitive goods of developed countries thus increasing unemployment,
recession, and poverty (Schoultz, 1998). Lack of public provisions can erode
public trust, which in turn can inflame rank-and-file tensions. Because of the
13

EU’s lack of attention upon domestic revenue development, Green (1999) argues
that the subsequent lack of infrastructure, basic service rehabilitation, and public
service pay guarantees that it is only a matter of time before the next conflict.

Peacekeeping in Africa
Many believe that decolonization led to the proliferation of conflict in the
under-developed world (Sadowski,1998; Szirmai, 2005). Consequently, many
scholars and peacekeeping envoys are looking towards newer and less
expensive measures to facilitate peacekeeping operations. One difficulty with
this endeavor is the longstanding animosity with former colonial powers that
further complicates and affects the efficacy of African peacekeeping (Addison &
Murshed, 2002). Addison and Murshed (2002) argue the initial creation and
agreement to a peace agreement depends largely upon the credibility of those
making the offer. Proof of this is noted by Diehl (1993), who states that the
ONUC was a break in the traditional peacekeeping operations of the time
because regional countries donated troops to help build the credibility of the
peacekeeping force with the Congolese people. Many are now looking at the
ethnic component as well as the political and economic components when
considering African peacekeeping operations.
In regards to preemptive peacekeeping measures, many scholars aim to
study the source of conflict within Africa, hoping that understanding it can
prescribe methods for the lasting effects of a successful peacekeeping mission.
14

Though ethnocentric peacekeeping orthodoxy is widely accepted, Adedeji (1999)
objects to ethnic divisions being a dividing force, so long as languages, religions
and cultural differences define ethnicity. He states that several stereotypes for
the source of African conflict are rooted in ethnic and tribal conflicts that often
stymie or regress development processes. According to Adedeji (1999), these
ethnic and tribal rivalries are often flared by the political elite for their own ends,
which in turn has led to conflict. However, Yahya Sadowski (1998) disagrees,
citing examples from the French and Belgian eras of Rwandan colonization.
Sadowski (1998) mentions that the Rwandan genocide was rooted in Belgian
political and social mechanisms that stymied the inter-caste movement which
existed during the French colonization period. This led to an adversarial social
construct between the two castes, and became increasingly militaristic.
Toure (1999) explains that peace is best achieved, through the
cooperation, strengthening and reexamination of sub-regional peacekeeping
capabilities. One of the reoccurring themes Toure (1999) touches upon is the
logistical, training, and financial shortcomings of these groups despite their
ideological strengths and commitments. These ideological strengths and
commitments are grounded in prevention. Some of the socio-economic
preventative measures include:
•

Instituting and implanting efficient democratic systems which take the
ethnic realities of each state into account

15

•

Instituting a system of government based on permanent social dialogue
and quest for political consensus

•

Establishing a judicial system which is accessible to and is perceived by
all as independent of the state

•

Respect for human rights and the rejection of impunity

•

Eradicating exclusion and intertwining ability in the running of public affairs

•

In cooperation with international organizations, conducting policies which
address issues such as debt, regional integration, women, children and
cultural identity.
(Toure, 1999, p. 24)

Despite the creation of the Cairo Declaration, which was meant to point to the
Organization of African Unity (OAU)/AU’s need to take a wider view of conflict
prevention, conflict management, and its resolution, Murray (2001) states that the
OAU/AU must improve their record of quelling gross human rights violations if
they are to meet the goals of conflict prevention.

The Creation of the OAU/AU- Their Mission and Their Challenges
The AU was born out of the (OAU). The OAU was created as a measure
of African resolve for pan-decolonization and promotion of African solidarity in
1963. When the OAU charter was signed, it incorporated 47 countries of varying
black and Arab origins as a measure to promote this solidarity (Binaisa 1977;
Biswaro, 2005). At a meeting of nation-states in Tripoli, Libya, H.E. Alpha Omar
16

Konare, President of the Republic of Mali at the time and Chairmen of The
Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) suggested the use
of the AU as a replacement for the OAU because the mission of OAU—African
liberation from the hold of colonialism—had been realized. According to Alpha
Omar Konare, the OAU had lost its political mandate and could not uphold the
economic mandate stated by the Abuja Treaty. It therefore follows that the AU
should function as a replacement for the OAU and should also serve as a
consolidation medium for the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) leading to
a (con)federation of states (Biswaro, 2005). This led to the genesis of Sirte II, a
draft Treaty to be submitted and signed in Lome on July 2000, marking the
beginning of the African Union (Biswaro, 2005).
Considering the motivation for peace was the catalyst for the formation of
regionalization, it follows that many regions have found themselves in
peacemaking and peacekeeping operations (Dinan, 2003). Therefore, once the
OAU met their goal of widespread decolonization, their focus shifted toward a
new mission: peace. Because the time span of the case studies within this thesis
straddles this change in the organization’s mission and title, this thesis will use
“AU” to refer to the “OAU” despite a reference prior to the 2000 conversion.

Impediments to Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Africa
Despite the virtue of peacemaking and peacekeeping, achieving and
maintaining peace in Africa is expensive. It is noted that UN peacekeeping
17

operations are mainly contingent upon the contributions of a disproportionate few
member states (namely the United States and a select other few wealthy nations)
(Khanna, et al., 1998; Sandler & Shimizu, 2002). Even though the UN does not
design its peacekeeping agenda based upon the price of a mission (Lebovic,
2004), insufficient funds can impede upon mission effectiveness (Khanna et al.,
1998). The probability of success within a peacekeeping mission relies largely
upon the organization, deployment, or direction of the force (Diehl, 1993). The
increase in demand for peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts is apparent by
the increase of the UN annual budget of peacemaking and peacekeeping
initiatives. In 1980, the annual budget for peace efforts was $180 million. In
1994, that cost increased to $3.5 billion (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002) and stands at
about $7 billion in 2008 (Deen, 2008). This documented proliferation of conflict
combined with a member-supported Peace Fund result in an over-stretched AU
peacekeeping machine. The UN reports that the AU Peace Fund is $48 million
in arrears in funding its peacemaking and peacekeeping operations (Berman &
Sams, 2000). This shortcoming in AU member funding provides an alarming
illustration of the organization’s inability to finance necessary and effective
peacemaking and peacekeeping campaigns. Given the price tag of peacemaking
and peacekeeping efforts, it follows that more effective and efficient uses of
peacekeeping funds are needed.
Mediation has been found to be one of those price-efficient forms of
peacekeeping. Mediation, as defined above, is the intercession of a third-party to
18

facilitate the resumption of communication between conflicting groups. This
often involves a face-to-face conversation to work out differences and offers
clarification of issues of contention, both with the intent to pacify conflict (ContehMorgan 2004). RAND corporation attributes the UN’s recent employment of
mediation tactics upon the African continent to a 40 percent decline in the
number of conflicts since 1992 (Deen, 2008). Furthermore, previous Secretary
General to the UN, Kofi Anan, utilized this form of peacekeeping to end postelection riots in Kenya at the price of a mere $208 thousand (Deen, 2008). Given
its recent track record, its recent deployment to stop the five-year conflict in
Darfur (Sudan Tribune, 2008), its history in other conflicts in Africa, as well as its
inexpensive price tag, mediation is noteworthy within the study of peacekeeping
because of its efficacy and relatively miniscule price tag.
However, financial and logistical means are not the only impediments to
peace. Political and cultural issues arise as well. Political constraints can
include policies of inaction. This is exemplified by China’s inaction towards
leveraging its economic power with Sudan to encourage a cessation in hostilities
(Yardley, 2008). Other political constraints include policies of home countries
which prevent peacemaking and peacekeeping goals from being set, such as
Morocco’s refusal to withdraw troops from Western Sahara as well as its
rejection of the presence of UN and AU troops in the area to facilitate a selfdetermination referendum (Naldi, 1985).
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Political impediments can also intertwine with ethnic constraints. The
drawing of arbitrary borders during colonization, for example, have separated
indigenous peoples, coupling rival clans together and potentially sewing seeds of
conflict. Furthermore, American and Russian funding of rival factions during the
Cold War have fanned hot flames of conflict, further deepening conflict (Binaisa,
1977). This thesis will explore the potential impediments cultural conflict offers to
the AU peacemaking and peacekeeping process.
In sum, the remainder of this thesis will focus on the record of
effectiveness of AU peacemaking and peacekeeping in the face of financial,
political, and socio-cultural obstacles. In particular, to what degree was the AU
able to accomplish the goals of peacemaking and peacekeeping in Darfur and
Western Sahara? What economic, political, and socio-cultural factors influence
the degree of the AU’s effectiveness in these conflicts? Are AU peacemaking
and peacekeeping efforts effective enough to influence the behavior of conflicting
parties towards a lasting peaceful coexistence? These questions are addressed
in the next two chapters dealing with the crisis in Darfur and Western Sahara,
respectively.
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Chapter 2: Darfur Case Study

Darfur Background
The Darfur crisis started when non-Arab ethnic groups believed their Arab
counterparts in the region were being disproportionably favored by the
government. This favoritism drove the disgruntled non-Arabs to take up arms
and on March 2003, fighting broke out between the government and these
groups. With the violence quickly escalating and the Government of Sudan
unable – or unwilling – to intervene in the hostilities, the Darfur crisis rapidly grew
to international spotlight as a genocidal catastrophe.1
This case study aims to survey and assess the AU’s intervention within
this crisis by first exploring the history of the conflict as well as its key groups and
players. It then outlines the peacemaking and peacekeeping agenda of the AU
as it develops over time, followed by an assessment of this agenda’s
effectiveness. It aims to answer questions asking why this agenda has not met its
goals and fighting in the region continues to proliferate.

1

I use the term “genocidal” over actually calling it a genocide because of the United Nation’s
conclusion that the Darfur crisis promulgated in Resolution 1564 (CNN, 2005), though dire, does
not fall under the categorization of genocide because the violence is indiscriminant and does not
target one ethnic group over another. This, of course, falls contradictory to many Fur nationalists
who claim quite the opposite. Given this contradiction in findings, the change in terminology is an
appropriate compromise between these two ideologies.
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Many ethnic groups reside within the area of Darfur, however the Furs
account for a majority of the population. With 40 percent of the total population
as non-Muslim Furs, Darfur has become a battleground wherein ethnic Furs have
become locked in warfare amongst Arab ethnicities in the region. Furthering
their distaste for Khartoum, many Furs perceived the government was arming
militias against them. This perception proliferated when policies following a
drought and famine sparked their estrangement from the Sudanese government
due to government favoritism towards the Arab population, state-program
mismanagement and overall neglect (BBC, 2008; Global Security, 2007). This
estrangement came to a head in February 2003 when both the Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked
government troops in protest of the government’s neglect to protect local
villagers from nomadic groups as well as the government’s failure to prevent their
economic marginalization (Amnesty International, 2008).
Although the majority of Darfur is comprised of ethnic Furs, it is important
for the sake of this case study to understand the ethno-geographic makeup of the
region. In addition to the Furs, Global Security (2007) reports that the central belt
region of Darfur also includes the non-Arab Masalit, Berti, Bargu, Bergid, Tama,
and Tunjur. The North is comprised of Zaghawa and Bedeyat who are also nonArab. It also includes the Arab Mahariya, Irayqat, Mahamid, and Beni Hussein.
Furthermore, the Arabs in the East and South are made up of Habbaniya, Beni
Halba, Maaliyya, Taaisha, and Rezeigat peoples. Much of the literature relating
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to conflict within this region classifies the inhabiting ethnicities as either being
Arab or non-Arab. This religious dichotomy illuminates the source of much of the
alienation which ethnic Furs and other non-Arabs feel toward the Arab-dominated
capitol of Sudan.
The fighting in Darfur became more pronounced as hostilities became
defined by a cleavage between Arab and non-Arab tribes. Furthermore, the
logistical and financial support offered to the Arab tribes by the Sudanese
Government continuously justified the non-Arab distaste and skepticism for
Khartoum and its policies (Human Rights Watch 2004). Non-Arab tribes began
to group together to fight against what they consider to be a central government
plot to redefine the demography of the Darfur region (Global Security, 2007).
The first of these groups, the JEM, is a rebel group whose leadership has
changed over the years. Global Security (2007) reports that the Sudanese
opposition leader, Hassan al-Turabi, was a former speaker of Sudan’s parliament
and later became a tenant of a Sudanese prison. Afterward, the BBC (2008)
states JEM was led by Lawyer Khali Ibrahim Muhammad who wrote The Black
Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan—a work documenting a
disproportionate amount of Arabs in powerful positions within Khartoum. This
group is a splinter cell of the SLM/A and had a few other rebel groups split off of
it, most notable of which are The National Movement for Reform and
Development (NMRD) and the National Redemption Front (NRF) (BBC, 2008).

23

The SLM/A started as the title of a self-defense militia comprised mostly of
ethnic Furs. Starting as the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), it changed its title to
SLM/A in March of 2003 (Global Security, 2007). Founded by Minni Arkoi
Minawi, SLM/A differs from its DLF secessionist movement by calling for a
creation of a “united, democratic Sudan” (Global Security 2007). The SLM/A
eventually split along ethnic cleavages in 2005. This schism produced the
SLM/A-Minni Faction, SLM/A-Abdel Wahid al-Nur faction, and the SLM/A-Unity
faction, which is most recently blamed for a September attack on an AU base in
which 10 AU soldiers were killed (BBC, 2008). The SLM/A-al-Nur, SLM/A-Minni,
and the JEM are the three most notable groups that fight for the causes of the
non-Arab tribes against their government-backed opposition, the Janjaweed.

Who are the Janjaweed?
In opposition to the SLM/A and JEM movements are the government of
Sudan and the Arab militias, namely the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed, loosely
translated to “a man with a horse and a gun”, is an Arab militia with whom the
SLM/A have been in conflict. The Janjaweed have been strong in the region;
they have pushed local communities off of their land and have secured funding
and armament from the Sudanese government to be a means of pro-government
support in the region. Khartoum denies supporting the militia despite Sudanese
government documents secured by Human Rights Watch (2004) that
demonstrate otherwise. According to Wax (2004), the Janjaweed is used by the
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government as a proxy fighting force against the JEM and SLM/A. As of 2004,
the Khartoum-backed Janjaweed militia has displaced 1.2 million people in the
Darfur region via violence, rape, and pillaging of villages (Wax, 2004).

Chronology of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
According to the Darfur Consortium (2008), the first rebel attack occurred
in February of 2003, and attempts at ceasefire agreements were achieved in
September of that same year. However each group accuses the other of
violations. April 2004 saw representatives of the rebel groups and the
Government of Sudan sign a ceasefire and protocol on the establishment of
humanitarian assistance in N’djamena. This agreement established a Ceasefire
Commission (CFC), and in June 2004 the first six observers were deployed to
the CFC headquarters in Darfur. One month later, the AU deployed a mission to
Darfur (AMIS) to help facilitate the ceasefire as well as peacekeeping operations.
That following August, the AU deployed its first set of troops in Darfur with the
assignment of monitoring the ceasefire, and January of 2005 brought a
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of Sudan and
the JEM as an agreement to end North-South conflict. Yet these agreements
were not upheld by all parties involved, namely the JEM. The AU increased the
number of its troops to 7,731 to be present in the vast region. However, this did
not prove to be enough support to contain the violence, and Khartoum endorsed
an additional 3,000 UN troops to support the currently struggling AMIS. Once
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again, the government of Sudan and the SLM/A-Minni signed the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2006. However this agreement did
not incorporate the other rebel groups in the region. So in June 2006, the AU
commission for Peace and Security and the Sudanese AU representative once
again met with SLM/A and JEM and signed a Declaration of Commitment to the
DPA. Later that month the AU issued sanctions against any group undermining
the DPA and reiterated its disapproval of the gross human rights violations within
the region. With chronic ceasefire violations, the AU accepted UN support thus
transferring power from AMIS to the United Nations/African Union Mission in
Darfur (AMID) in 2009 (NATO, 2009).
The need for peacemaking and peacekeeping is apparent in Darfur;
however, the financial, political, and socio-cultural hindrances make these
operations increasingly difficult for the AU. To better understand these
hindrances, this case study will analyze the AU agenda for peace followed by an
analysis of the financial, political, and socio-cultural impediments to achieving a
lasting peace in Darfur.

Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Agenda
Per the definition of peacemaking and peacekeeping outlined previously,
there first must be a successful peacemaking mission to achieve peace before
peacekeeping activities can maintain it. Therefore, the main item on a
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peacemaking agenda is to achieve a ceasefire because peacekeeping
operations must be done in a context free of the antagonism of open violence.
However, as expanded upon below, achieving a ceasefire agreement on paper is
much easier than enforcing one.

The Darfur Peace Agreement
Examination of the DPA offers a closer look at the goals and aspirations of
the Darfur peace process. Signed May 5th, 2006 by the Government of Sudan
and SLM/A-Minni Faction, the DPA outlines in six chapters a comprehensive
peace agreement stating the peacemaking and peacekeeping goals outlined
within its chapter titles:
Chapter 1: Power Sharing
Chapter 2: Wealth Sharing
Chapter 3: Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final Security Arrangements
Chapter 4: Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation
Chapter 5: General Provisions
Chapter 6: Implementation Modalities and Timelines
(Darfur Peace Agreement, 2006, p. i)
I will focus mainly upon Chapters 1-3 as they contain the major thrust of the
peacemaking and peacekeeping strategy within the region. Because the
chronology of the DPA requires the goals in the “Comprehensive Ceasefire and
Final Security Arrangements” chapter to be met first, I will focus upon this
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chapter and then follow with the goals outlined within Chapters 1 and 2
thereafter.
Chapter 3, titled “Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final Security
Arrangements”, offers a more detailed view as to how ceasefire agreements are
to be handled by the signatories. Section (A) deals with the ceasefire itself,
stating a reaffirmation of commitment to previous ceasefire agreements. It
continues to state that the parties will refrain from armed conflict as well as
undertake
…measures to neutralize and disarm the Janjaweed/armed militias in like
with UN resolutions 1556 and 1564, the AU summit Resolutions, the
N’djamena Agreement and the November 2004 Abuja Protocol such that
security in Darfur is assured.
(DPA, 2006, Article 22, paragraph 214(f))
Additionally, Article 23 surveys the purpose of the comprehensive ceasefire
beginning within 72 hours of the signing of the DPA, stating it aims to:
•

Ensure that a ceasefire is maintained within the region,

•

Uphold a commitment to prevent violence, intimidation, or forced
displacement,

•

Place population safety as the highest priority,

•

To ensure humanitarian aid to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and

•

Demonstrate a commitment of all the parties involved within the peace
agreement to cooperate with AMIS in facilitating it.

By signature, this portion of the agreement obligates the signatories to spread
awareness of the ceasefire to all allies, citizens, and associated groups. Article
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24 states the prohibited activities which include attacks, harassment, or violence
upon AMIS personnel, activities which are gender-based, or which impede the
distribution of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, it restricts covert and overt
activities which may impede upon the peacekeeping mission within the area.
Article 25 speaks towards methods to reinforce the ceasefire agreement by
asking the AU and its international partners to maintain proper funding so that
AMIS may fulfill its mission. It mandates the creation of a Ceasefire Commission
chaired by the AMIS Force Commander to engage in monitoring on behalf of a
Joint Commission. The Joint Commission will be based at the AU headquarters
in Addis Ababa and chaired by a Special Representative of the Chairperson of
the AU Commission, and together these two commissions will monitor and police
the ceasefire. This Article 25 also creates the Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and
Monitoring Unit (JHFMU) which is a joint UN-AU body which was created to
observe and facilitate the humanitarian assistance in the area, as well as observe
the safety of human rights. The JHFMU’s observations will be sent to the Joint
Commission, the Ceasefire Commission, AMIS and other regulatory bodies
where appropriate for oversight. While Article 26 speaks toward the care of
internally displaced peoples, Article 27 outlines the goals and methods of which
all parties are to disengage and exhibit means to control the distribution of arms
and assigns the charge of policing of this endeavor to the Ceasefire Commission.
The rest of this chapter describes the communication strategies and
organizational plans for the completion and maintenance of the ceasefire.
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Preparations for this ceasefire are to be done within 30 days of signing the
DPA, and the first phase of disengagement is to be completed within 45 days.
Phase one consists of a quarantine of activities of the undersigned parties to
prescribed areas as well as the creation and monitoring of buffer zones around
the IDP camps and humanitarian aid routes. The control of the Janjaweed militia
will also begin within phase one.
Phase two, which continues many of the projects of phase one (with the
exception of starting to disarm the Janjaweed, releasing of detainees, and the
beginning of restoration of the area) is mandated to take no longer than 45 days
as well. Phase three, which mandates the detainment of large artillery and other
types of weaponry is to be handed over to secure locations maintained by AMIS.
Phase three is to be started after phase two and should be completed within 30
days.
Article 29 explains the reintegration of Darfur into the national system.
Much of this portion of the DPA spends time explaining how to disarm, assemble,
and demobilize former combatants and reintegrate them into society.
Furthermore, it creates a security advisory team which will aid in this endeavor.
It also speaks toward building the capacity and the capability of the police force
of the Government of Sudan.
The cessation of hostilities, as outlined above, marks the beginning of the
peacekeeping process. The first two chapters of the DPA offer insight as to how
exactly the signatories are to share power and distribute wealth once hostilities
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have ceased. Knowing that the Darfur crisis started with rebel groups acting out
in response to the neglect of its civilians’ civil rights, it follows then that Chapter 1
of the DPA outlines the importance of mutual respect between the state and its
citizens. This is expressed through Article 1 wherein the sovereignty of the
Republic of Sudan is recognized as well as the importance of respect for human
and civil rights, particularly voting rights is stressed. Article 2 expresses the
agreed upon criteria and guidelines for power sharing, where Article 3
emphasizes and elaborates upon human rights and freedoms. This article
outlines the rights afforded to every individual and reads much like the United
States Bill of Rights, including inter alia, the right to due process, the right to vote
despite gender, the right of every citizen to own property, and the right of
freedom of assembly regardless of gender, ethnic origin, place of birth, or
religion. This is of importance because these are the very rights and freedoms
which served as the catalyst of the Darfur crisis.
To best facilitate the rights outlined within the DPA, Articles 4-7 outline the
system of governance between all levels of government. In particular, Article 6
offers how state governance will take affect and speaks to the administration of
Darfur. It also establishes a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) in
which the SLM/A and the JEM are represented, and it serves as the principle
implementation authority of the DPA within the region. It further outlines how the
TDRA will be structured, how it would be financed, and that the TDRA would be
in charge of its own rules of procedure. Article 6 further creates a permanent
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status of Darfur through a referendum in three states within the region, and
states that this referendum will be supervised by the National Election
Commission (NEC). Articles 8, 9, and 10 offer governance structure of an
executive, legislative, and judicial branch of the national government,
respectively, while Article 12 offers how military and police enforcement shall be
structured. Articles 13 and 14 discuss how other national institutions,
commissions, and bureaucratic agencies will be organized. Article 15 speaks of
the location of the national capitol, while Article 16 explains pre-election power
sharing within Darfur. It states the composition of gubernatorial seats shall be
held by one of the states in Darfur as well as assigns deputy governor powers to
nominees of the SLM/A and JEM. In similar vain, this article continues to assign
various administrative responsibilities to representatives from both of these
groups.
Chapter 2, titled “Wealth Sharing,” emphasizes fiscal and monetary
principles that shall be created to ensure the equity of wealth across social
classes, not only on a fiscal level, but on a livelihood basis as well. Per Article
17, the DPA states that all have the right to, inter alia, safe drinking water, free
access to markets, access to quality education, security of property, freedom
from hunger, promotion and protection of cultural heritage, and restitution of
property for those affected by conflict. As seen here, the DPA creates a
construct wherein the state revenue and wealth is appropriated to assure human
rights as well as fiscal responsibility to citizenry. Article 18 outlines the fiscal
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federalism and the intergovernmental relationships that are to take place
amongst the various levels of government.
Chapter 2, Article 19 discusses the economic policies that would fund
reconstruction and development.

It emphasizes creating macro economic

policy which favors investment, development, research and development, and it
recognizes the need to support the large agricultural sector within the region. It
further surveys strategic post-conflict objectives towards development and
reinvigoration of Darfur, most of which covers the building of infrastructure as
well as the encouragement of the people of Darfur to produce goods and
services. Furthermore, it creates the Darfur Reconstruction and Development
Fund (DRDF), which it will serve as an intermediary between domestic or
international donors and Darfur for the region’s reconstruction. It also states that
the Sudanese Government will allocate $300 million as seed money for the
DRDF as well as an additional $200 million for 2007 and 2008 depending on the
outcome of the Joint Assessment Mission to Darfur. The Joint Assessment
Mission for the Darfur states (JAM) was also created by the DPA to:
…identify and quantify the needs of post-conflict economic recovery,
development, and poverty eradication program for Darfur states. These
needs will be presented to the donors at a donors’ conference to be
convened three months after the signing of this Agreement.
(DPA, 2006, Article 19, para. 155)

This conference will potentially include the African Development Bank, the AU,
the EU, the League of Arab States, and the US amongst others.
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Article 20 defines of land rights as well as the disbursement of natural
resources. Article 21 speaks towards the needed programs for internally
displaced persons (IDPS) and refugees who have been affected by the conflict
by first legalizing their right to fundamental freedoms and reinforcing their human
rights, especially choice of residence which includes their right to re-establish a
homestead at their place of origin. It is clear through this chapter that the desire
of all parties involved (on paper at least) is to assure human rights especially with
the allocation of funds, policies of redevelopment, and equity in disbursement of
natural resources.
One of the issues that plagued the DPA was that only one of the three
rebel forces initially signed the agreement (Sudan Tribune, June 2006). The fact
that the other remaining rebel groups did not sign the DPA resulted in many
incidences where violence was committed by these groups (Sudan Tribune, June
2006). In February of 2007, the Darfur Peace Agreement Joint Commission
reported to the AU Commission regarding the ceasefire violations which occurred
since their last report in December of 2006 (Sudan Tribune, February 2007). The
noted decrease in Janjaweed activity was starkly contrasted by reports of the
Joint Commission of a continuance of violence between all parties within Darfur
as well as an increase in assaults on AMIS and aid agencies’ personnel (Sudan
Tribune, February 2007).
Further agreements and ceasefires have been made since the DPA, all of
which have not been respected. In November 2008, Sudan President Al-Bashir
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made a ceasefire announcement only for rebels to allege attacks by government
military two days later (Sudan Tribune, November 2008). With the many
ceasefire agreements signed, dated and violated by the signatories in the past,
the collapse of the recently-signed Doha peace agreement between the
Government of Sudan and the JEM in February 2009 is not a question of if but
likely when.
The consistent reiteration of peace agreements displayed in this timeline
illustrates AMIS aptitude to mediate a ceasefire agreement but lack of ability to
enforce it. Furthermore, closer assessment reveals that poor funding and
inadequate logistical support is only part of the puzzle.

Financial Shortcomings
As a demonstration of the AU’s failure to meet logistical and financial
needs of peacemaking and peacekeeping, the AU has made calls for funding
vital to these missions. Due to the overstretched 7,000 troops in the region,
many AU soldiers are not paid for weeks on end. Furthermore, AU
peacekeepers are consistently attacked or abducted; 19 AU peacekeepers have
been killed in Darfur since 2004, a Nigerian officer has been reported missing,
and approximately 90 AU vehicles in the region have been hijacked (Sudan
Tribune, May 2008a). Since the failure of the 2006 peace deal signed by the
Minni-faction of the SLM/A, Khartoum continues to reject the use of a UN
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peacekeeping troop support for the AU. Furthermore, the government and rebels
have both been guilty of ceasefire violations; the AU publicly condemned an
“unprovoked” attack by government aircraft on rebel territory in northern Darfur,
and though rebels have claimed there have been other attacks thereafter, the
Sudanese government has denied these claims (Sudan Tribune, May 2008a).
Analysts have stated, “without the capacity to forcefully implement the [DPA],
security has deteriorated, its implementation fell behind schedule, and its
perceived failure became a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Sudan Tribune, September
2006).
The financial shortcomings of the AU to meet the logistical challenges of
the Sudanese infighting continue to force the organization to look for international
support.

Much of this support is financial rather than troop contributions

because, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the “UN has sought to place
most of the burden of carrying out the goals contained in Security Council
resolutions 1556 and 1564 on the shoulders of the nascent African Union”
(Human Rights Watch, 2005). Furthermore, HRW believes that much of the
world looks to the AU for solving the Darfur crisis because of their ability to
achieve an, albeit short, ceasefire in 2006 with the DPA. Concurrently, the US
and the EU see this prospect to support the AU’s assumption of this
responsibility as an opportunity to prevent their own soldiers from going into a
violent milieu. However, the AU also views this as an opportunity to establish
itself as a significant regional power on the African continent (Human Rights
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Watch, 2005).

This reliance on outside funding, however, ultimately chips away

at the AU’s chances at achieving this reputation. Furthermore, these
shortcomings continue to illustrate that the AU has assumed a responsibility far
greater than it can handle. AU success is dependent, according to HRW, upon
the willingness of the U.S. and the E.U. to fund the AU’s peacekeeping
endeavors within the region (Human Rights Watch, 2005).
The willingness to fund the AU can be easily documented. Britain offered
support and training for the AU’s plans to increase troop output to 7,700 troops
and civilian police at the cost of $466 million (Global Security, 2005). The EU
pledged €40 million which the AU designated as development funds to help keep
the peacekeeping effort afloat. Furthermore, in June 2005, Britain raised its
financial contribution to the AU’s peacekeeping force in Darfur from £6.6 million
to £19 million. This money was meant to help fund the peacekeeping operations
until the UN-AU hybrid force is active (Sudan Tribune, May 2008a). Secretary of
State for international development, Hilary Benn, mentioned that these funds
would be used to buy 500 additional vehicles as well as other rapid deployment
equipment (Sudan Tribune, May 2008a). Much of this equipment is needed,
especially when the Janjaweed militia continues to be subsidized by Khartoum’s
oil revenue. The shortcoming of arms was supplemented by an arms embargo,
but in October of 2006, UNSC Panel of Experts reported all parties in violation of
the arms embargo in Darfur—much of these violations belonging to China
(African Consortium, 2008).
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Hybrid Force: Messiah or Myth?
The UN-AU hybrid force will be used to replace the ineffective AU force of
7,000 troops with a 23,000 person operation. The EU has already given €400
million to the AU mission to help with the transition to the hybrid force. However,
plenty of accusations coming from outside the government state that Khartoum
has been trying to delay the deployment of the much-needed force (Sudan
Tribune, May 2008b).
A US State Department official stated that they believe Sudan was still
looking for a way out of accepting the hybrid force. Sudan insisted that any
forces that were in terms of the Addis Ababa communiqué will be under AU
command. However, former President Bush’s Special Envoy to Sudan stated
that the Addis Ababa communiqué expressed clearly that the hybrid force would
be under UN command and control. In actuality, the hybrid force has a military
and political component. The political component will be reporting to the UN as
well as the AU (Sudan Tribune, April 2007).
UNSC resolution 1706 in August 2006 authorized deployment of 17,300
troops to Darfur to assume “responsibilities currently taken on by the AMIS in
relation to implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Sudanese President
Omar Al-Bashir calls the resolution ‘part of a comprehensive conspiracy for
confiscating the country’s sovereignty’” (Darfur Consortium, 2008). While AlBashir’s anti-UN message is reiterated at the summit of Chinese and African
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leaders in Beijing in November 2006, the Sudanese Government accepted UNAU hybrid force in June 2007 with the condition that the troops are recruited
primarily from African countries (Darfur Consortium 2008). This seems to be an
exploited loophole by Khartoum officials, as the 7,700 troops currently in the
region are donated from African countries; clearly, if more troops were available
for donation, they would be there already. Understanding this, the U.S. rejected
this allegation, stating that the US strongly encourages further contributions of
troops to this force by African nations, but if they fall short, they have no other
choice than to look outside the continent (Sudan Tribune, April 2007).
Furthermore, juxtaposing the Addis Ababa communiqué with Resolution
1706, it becomes clear why Khartoum stresses this slant of the agreement over
the UN resolution. The tripartite commission created by the Addis Ababa
agreement gives Khartoum veto power on the composition and size of the
peacekeeping force (Sudan Tribune, April 2007), furthering its power and
influence on the pace and effectiveness of peacemaking and peacekeeping
operations.
If the monies and logistical support offered by the UN was not hampered
by political conditions and motivations on the part of Khartoum, the hybrid force
would likely offer the AU much needed support in peacemaking and
peacekeeping endeavors. However, it seems clear that Khartoum has made
every effort to increase the difficulty of the AMIS mission. It is these political
impediments which reinforce the financial shortcomings, which further
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exacerbate the Darfur crisis while making the peacemaking and peacekeeping
mission increasingly difficult.

Political Impediments
Political impediments to AU peacemaking and peacekeeping span across
the domestic as well as the international realm. As explained below, funding of
Arab militias by an Arab run Sudanese Government as well as working with the
emboldened Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir, presents an uphill battle to
making and keeping the peace in the region. Adding insult to injury is the
Sudanese oil export to China which provides the government with the revenue to
arm their military as well as the Janjaweed militia. This systemic opposition to
peace illustrated below offers insight to the failure of the DPA, representing
present and future challenges faced by the AU-UN mission.

State Sponsored Violence
The state-sponsored violence is a unique impediment to the peacemaking
and peacekeeping process because it incorporates all three impediments which
are discussed in this case study; it is the use of oil revenues by political officials
to exploit the religious and ethnic cleavages. The state-sponsored violence
waged against the ethnic tribes by the Arab militias has continued to fuel
hostilities and stymie AU efforts to maintain a ceasefire. Given the oil revenues
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used for the purchasing of arms, the Government-backed Janjaweed have acted
as the military proxy against SLM/A and others. This was in response to the nonArab groups taking up arms in 2003 as protest against Khartoum’s neglect of
upholding their land and economic rights (Amnesty International, 2008). Though
some Janjaweed have been captured, tried and punished, many believe this to
be a symbolic gesture by Khartoum to appease international pressure to reign in
the Arab vigilantes (BBC News, 2004).
Given their heavy funding and armament from Khartoum, the Janjaweed
have become a formidable foe for the JEM and SLM/A factions. The numbers of
casualties reported to date in 2006 have varied greatly. Global Security (2007)
reports that 600,000 civilians have been displaced and 75,000 have fled to
neighboring Chad, while 3,000 unarmed civilians have been killed in 2003.
Furthermore, International Herald Tribune (Polgreen, 2006) reported that at least
200,000 died at the hands of the Janjaweed and government forces. Other
experts in the field put the death range between 300,000 to 550,000 people
(Hearn, 2006).

Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir
As mentioned earlier, there have been ceasefire violations on the part of
rebel groups as well as the Government of Sudan. While each accuses the other
as the main perpetrator of the violation, many cannot help but look at the
leadership of Sudan as a main impediment to AU-UN peacekeeping operations.
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President Omar Al-Bashir has refused the use of UN peacekeeping forces
as a supplement to AMIS several times. Because of these ceasefire violations,
the refusal of logistical help from the international community, and the undeniable
religious cleft between warring factions, many have accused Al-Bashir of
engaging in genocidal activities, leading an Arab centered government and
funding an Arab militia against predominately Christian rebel groups (MSNBC
World News, 2009).
The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for Al-Bashir’s
arrest on charges of war crimes on March 4, 2009. The warrant illustrates that
Al-Bashir is charged with five counts of crimes against humanity and two war
crimes. It states that:
The above-mentioned crimes were allegedly committed during a five year
counter-insurgency campaign by the Government of Sudan against the
Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) and other armed groups opposing the Government of
Sudan in Darfur…. A core component of that campaign was the unlawful
attack on that part of the civilian population of Darfur – belonging largely to
the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups – perceived to be close to the
organized armed groups opposing the Government of Sudan in Darfur.
(ICC, 2009)
Al-Bashir’s response to this warrant was to denounce the ICC Tribunal, the UN,
and aid agencies as a “new colonialism”. He thereafter revoked the licenses of
10 aid agencies and ordered them to leave Darfur. One of these agencies,
CARE, is a Kenyan based agency which focuses upon water and food
distribution to approximately 600,000 people in the region (MSNBC World News,
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March 2009). Revoking aid will only further destabilize and consequently inflame
violence in the region.
Many have been waiting anxiously for the repercussions of the
international indictment and now are attempting to find everyway to contain its
fallout. Methods range from the new US administration pushing for Al-Bashir to
step down to the UN Security Council invoking its power to postpone the warrant
for one year (Hanson, 2009). Al-Bashir’s recent emboldened actions show that
the former is far less likely than the latter.
Despite the disagreement amongst the ICC tribunal justices as to whether
Darfur qualifies as a genocide, this indictment and its results illustrate the
reactionary personality of President Al-Bashir, placing him as another step in the
uphill climb for an AU-brokered peace.

The Chinese Variable
Some believe that Khartoum’s perpetuation of violence and reluctance to
cooperate with international pressure to cease their support of ethnic violence is
due to the fact that peace would mean exposing the Chinese oil industry to
international competition in Sudanese oil fields and would jeopardize their
Sudanese-Sino relationship (Goodman, 2004). This relationship is highly prized
by the Sudanese Government because Khartoum reaps hundreds of millions in
oil sales to China. Heavy investment of Chinese oil firms in the area, as well as
construction of basic infrastructure meant to efficiently extract and ship oil has led
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to the Sudanese Government’s protection of Chinese interests while fueling
motivation for assault on rebels who reside within the oil rich region. Sudan is
China’s largest supplier of oil while China is Sudan’s largest supplier of arms. Of
the $500 million in revenue received from oil sales to China in 1999, 80 percent
went to arms purchases. Furthermore, Sudan enjoyed Chinese assistance to
build and outfit three weapons factories outside of Khartoum (Goodman, 2004).
Needless to say, AMIS forces are outgunned as well as out-funded by the
Government of Sudan, making peacemaking and peacekeeping operations
difficult while rebel groups take out their frustrations upon Chinese workers. For
example, 9 Chinese oil workers were kidnapped, presumably by the JEM, in
October of 2008 (New York Times, October 2008).
Furthermore, China’s friendly foreign relations with Sudan combined with
its position on the UN Security Council has proven advantageous in defending
against potential UN disciplinary action. Any threat of sanctions on oil sales is
countered by a threat of Chinese veto of any such policy (Goodman, 2004).
However, recent voting patterns in the UN Security Council have demonstrated a
positive Chinese voting pattern. The resolution to create an AU-UN hybrid force
was nearly unanimously passed, with the only abstention coming from the US.
This abstention has been hypothesized to result from the US intelligence
community who has relied upon Khartoum to provide intelligence on al-Qaeda
whereabouts within the region (Sudan Watch, June 2005).
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As seen above, the empowerment of the Janjaweed by a rebellious
president offers an uphill battle for the UN-AU mission in Darfur. Chinese
funding offers Khartoum the opportunity to out-gun, outnumber, and out-finance
the rebel groups which it is charged to eradicate as well as the peacemakers who
aim to stop them.

Socio-Cultural Clash
When considering the Darfur crisis, one must also consider the vast
cleavages between the various ethnicities and religious groups. Not only is there
a clear division and clash between Arab Janjaweed and Christian rebel groups,
but differing agendas within the SLM/A has also led to infighting. The
introduction to this case study outlines the various factions of the SLM/A,
however, it is important to highlight here in depth the differences between the first
and largest split of the SLM/A.

Ethnic Cleavages
The splintering of the SLM/A and JEM into multiple ethnic fighting groups
makes achieving a ceasefire agreement and other peace talks difficult (Amnesty
International, 2008). Because mediation involves achieving a compromised
solution between all warring parties, it becomes increasingly difficult when the
number of warring parties continues to proliferate, as do their unique demands
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and priorities. As seen by the excluded factions in the CPA and the DPA, the
mandate of the peace agreements is undermined due to lack of representation.
This in turn offers the unrepresented groups license to continue with attacks
because of a perceived illegitimate mandate.
To understand the SLM/A unity issues, it is important to understand the
leaders and their backgrounds. The political arm of the SLM/A, led by
Abdulwahed Mohamed al-Nur of Fur ethnicity, split over a power struggle with
Minni Arkou Minnawi of Zaghawa ethnicity and the head commander of the
military arm of the SLM/A. The split came as a major tactical blow to the SLM/A
because the Zaghawa represent a majority of their military force (Sudan Tribune,
October 2005).
The division has been noted to hamper peace talks, negotiations, as well
as the strength of peace agreements. After the signing of the DPA, violence
increased as many factions stated that the DPA does not meet the concerns of
Arab nomadic groups due to exclusion from the development process. The Nurfaction as well as the JEM refused to sign the DPA because they state that it
failed to fulfill their demands for a greater political representation, compensatory
aid, and stronger security. In light of this, the DPA became an issue of
contention between the rebel groups and a source of infighting in the region
(Sudan Tribune, September 2006).

Humanitarian sources state that signatories

use the DPA as a “shield” to justify waging war on those who had not signed it
while the non-signatories use its shortcomings as license for hostilities (Sudan
46

Tribune, September 2006). In the region west of El Fasher, for example, al-Nur’s
forces clashed with minni-SLM/A commanders and displaced 50,000 people
between July and September of 2006 (Sudan Tribune, September 2006).
However, nearly a year later, peace was brokered between the factions,
uniting nine rebel Darfur factions under one charter. This unification involves six
factions of the SLM/A, the Democratic Popular Front, the Sudanese
Revolutionary Front, and a JEM splinter group under the single umbrella of the
SLM/A. The factions united stating that a peace in Darfur starts with a united
front (Sudan Tribune, November 2007). The lack of infighting represented by this
unification increases the probability that a lasting peace could be assured, if only
slightly.

Conclusion
Much of the peacemaking and peacekeeping agenda in the Darfur region
was subject to poorly financed operations combined with political impediments
empowered by Chinese involvement and investment in the region. Furthermore,
ethnic and religious tensions continue to flare while Khartoum, until recently,
refused the incoming of much-needed UN aid, infrastructure, and personnel.
However, with the peacekeeping personnel on the way in, humanitarian aid is
prematurely on its way out, leaving a greater chance for the proliferation of
violence.
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The failure of the DPA exemplifies the failures of the AU peacemaking
machine. The 2006 Agreement outlined peacemaking as well as peacekeeping
procedures in depth; however, it failed to secure a lasting ceasefire that
prevented any further peacekeeping endeavors. Without a legitimate ceasefire
agreement signed and respected by all warring parties, peacekeeping missions
will not be successful. The mutual desire between the international community
and the AU to tackle the Darfur issue offers potential for the AU to meet
peacemaking and peacekeeping goals with international funding. However, the
funneling of oil profits into the region offers a defiant Khartoum the use of these
funds to arm the Janjaweed. This offers a large hurdle to AU peacemaking and
peacekeeping as attempts to achieve and maintain a ceasefire are thwarted by
financial shortcomings, political impediments, and ethnic cleavages. But are
these findings limited to Darfur? We explore this question in Chapter 3 with the
study of Western Sahara.
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Chapter 3: Western Sahara Case Study

When Western Sahara underwent decolonization, Morocco and
Mauritania jumped at the opportunity to lay claim to the territory. The AU Charter
states that the colonized territory is to be returned to the country that held
sovereignty over it prior to colonization (Binaisa, 1977). While Morocco and
Mauritania claim that portions of Western Sahara were within their territory, the
indigenous people to the land claimed the region was home to nomadic tribes
who bore allegiance to neither country when it was colonized and therefore did
not belong to either country. An armed resistance movement to Morocco’s
annexation of the area resulted in over a decade of violent conflict. Increased
hostility over these irreconcilable differences has brought the Western Sahara
case to the fore in international peacemaking and peacekeeping.
This case study aims to examine the AU’s intervention in this crisis by first
exploring the history of the conflict as well as its key groups and players. It will
then outline the peacemaking and peacekeeping agenda of the AU as it
developed over time, followed by an appraisal of this agenda’s successes and
challenges. It will aim to answer a major question: Why has the AU met only
some of its goals, resulting in a 17 year stalemate?
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Chronology of Conflict
The source of conflict in the area began when Spain withdrew from the
colonized region of Western Sahara. Morocco and Mauritania both laid claim to
the region while the indigenous people decided to exercise their right to selfdetermination as supported by the UN Charter (1945).2 Despite an International
Court of Justice (ICJ) decision upholding the Saharawis’ right to selfdetermination in 1975 (Okere, 1979) in accordance to the UN Charter, Morocco
and Mauritania annexed Western Sahara. In response to this annexation of the
region by the two countries, the Saharawis people armed themselves to defend
their right to self-determination. Calling themselves the Frente Popular para la
Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Polisario Front), they constitute a
liberation movement made up of the area’s indigenous people, the Saharawis
(Hodges, 1984). They also founded the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR) in 1976, which is their political and governmental arm. Though the
Polisario Front drove out Mauritanian forces, the conflict between the Polisario
Front and the Moroccan government has been ongoing until a ceasefire
agreement in 1991 (Naldi. 1985).
When conflict became hot in 1976 it lasted until the above mentioned
ceasefire in 1991. During this time, the Polisario Front appeared to have the
2

Chapter I, Article 1, subsection 2 reads, “The purposes of the United Nations are to develop friendly
relations among nations on respect for principle for equal rights and self-determination of peoples…” (UN
Charter, 1945). Also, the 61st session of the of the General Assembly adopted resolution 61/295, “United
Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” which further provides support for the Saharawis
right to self-determination (UN, 2007).

50

advantage by forcing the Mauritanian forces to withdraw and inflicting large
losses upon the Moroccan forces. Events were in favor of Western Saharan selfdetermination until US funding and support of the Moroccan government turned
the tide. In 1988, Morocco and the Polisario Front agreed to settle the dispute by
referendum for self-determination; but disputes over voter eligibility and ballot
content prevented the referendum from ever occurring. As a renewed attempt to
achieve the referendum, the 1991 ceasefire offered a bargain between the two
by offering a ceasefire in exchange for the referendum for self-determination.
The Polisario Front agreed to cease armed conflict, however the referendum has
yet to occur.
In 2007, after several attempts at administering a referendum, AU
facilitation and UN observation brought the two warring parties together for faceto-face negotiations. Morocco offered a political solution to allow the territory of
Western Sahara to have autonomy within the Kingdom of Morocco. In return, the
Polisario Front agreed to continue the cessation of hostilities so long as there
would be a referendum in the near future. The talks ended with the extension of
the UN Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until April of
2009 per UN resolution 1813 (2008e). While the Saharawis people still wait for
their referendum, the US State Department (February 2009) press release
states that Morocco still considers the Western Sahara part of the Kingdom, as a
result all civil liberties and human rights are modeled after the same laws which
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apply to the Kingdom of Morocco, therefore creating ultimate authority in the
region to stem back to King Mohammed IV of Morocco.
While the need for peacemaking and peacekeeping in Western Sahara is
clear, financial, political, and socio-cultural obstacles prevent the AU from
effective peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavors. To understand these
obstacles, this study will survey and assess them in the context of the AU’s
agenda for peace in the region.

Agenda for Peace
The AU’s agenda for peace met difficult opposition when Morocco
vehemently rejected many of the AU peace initiatives. In 1979, the AU took its
first attempt at creating a peace initiative that involved assessments and
recommendations with regards to how to proceed in peacemaking and
peacekeeping within the region. In so doing, the AU designated “two
committees: the Ad Hoc Committee, also known as the Committee of Wise Men;
and the Implementation Committee” to the Western Sahara conflict (Naldi. 1985,
p. 34). Each of these committees are discussed in turn.
The Ad Hoc Committee created a sub-committee charged with the task to
accumulate and implement the best plans toward the restoration of peace and
security in the region. This involved a tour of Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and
Spain, resulting in the Ad Hoc Committee’s adoption of recommendations for
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self-determination for Western Sahara and directions to reach this objective.
These recommendations were submitted in July of 1979 which led to AU
Resolution 114 (1979). It recommended the following:
•

A ceasefire between warring parties to be supervised by the AU;

•

The withdrawal of Moroccan troops from Western Sahara;

•

The right for Saharawis to hold a referendum deciding self-determination;

•

A meeting of all involved parties to support the decision of the referendum;
and

•

The establishment of a special committee, with the help of the UN, to
oversee and maintain a fair election.
(Naldi, 1985)
Consisting of representatives from Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra

Leon, Sudan, and Tanzania, the Implementation Committee was charged with
the responsibility to work with the UN regarding the implementation of the ceasefire and to oversee the administration of the referendum (Naldi, 1985). In
addition to the peacemaking and peacekeeping forces which would be in the
region, the also suggested a possible military observation group possibly
including a civilian police component which would have the authority to oversee
the ceasefire as well (Naldi, 1985).
Each of these recommendations by the ad hoc and implementation
committees has merit based on the principles of peacemaking and
peacekeeping; however, theory and reality rarely coincide. The AU voted to
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endorse the recommendations made by the Implementation Committee to
attempt to achieve a ceasefire and to hold a referendum in December 1983
(Naldi, 1985). Despite several fruitless negotiations promising a referendum vote
by the mid-1980s, joint AU-UN peacemaking operations did achieve a ceasefire
in exchange for a promised referendum vote for self-determination of the
Saharawis people to take place shortly thereafter. While the Polisario Front has
faithfully and strictly held to the ceasefire agreement since 1991 until today,
Morocco has left the referendum vote to currently remain as a promise (Zunes,
2007).

Financial Woes
Financial impediments have plagued the AU in Western Sahara since the
AU’s peacemaking and peacekeeping experience in Chad. Naldi (1985) offers a
concise account of the AU’s peacekeeping debacle in Chad which had lasting
effects upon the AU’s peacekeeping reputation as an under-funded and
unreliable peacekeeping organization.
The 1981 peacekeeping force sent by the AU to Chad was envisioned to
be an armed, neutral party to cease hostilities and negotiate peace. However,
their peacekeeping mandate in the region was unclear to the warring parties, and
the peacekeeping force was seen as another force to battle. Combined with lack
of financial and logistical capabilities, the negotiating aptitude of the AU
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peacekeeping force was undermined. After suffering losses and lack of a
political solution on the horizon, countries began withdrawing troops from the
already under-manned peacekeeping force, guaranteeing the failure of the AU’s
peacekeeping mission in Chad.
Some member states may have been reluctant to show support for a
peacemaking or peacekeeping force in Western Sahara because of the Chadian
debacle. Furthermore, the UN’s resolution to help with aid and logistical support
further justifies member states’ desire to limit contributions (Naldi, 1985).

US-Morocco Relationship
When assessing the supporters of each side of this conflict, the financial
support appears to fall along a Cold War division. While the Soviet Union was in
alliance of Algeria, who support the Polisario Front, the US has poured over 20
percent of its African aid into Morocco. This funding allowed Morocco to turn the
tide of war to their favor (Zunes, 1998).3
Nevertheless, the additional fiscal US support creates a financial hardship
on the AU and UN as peacemaking missionaries who are out-funded and outgunned. Morocco has received in excess of $1 billion in military aid and $1.3
billion in economic assistance from the United States in exchange for Morocco to
be the United State's longest and most reliable ally within Africa and the Arab

3

The Cold War relationship which describes those funding both sides of the Western Sahara
conflict begs the question: was the 1991 ceasefire agreement and the end of the Cold War shortly
thereafter a coincidence?
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world. In exchange for the financial support, US forces are welcome at all
Moroccan ports-of-call and have rights to land, refuel, and airspace within
Morocco. Furthermore, Morocco has participated in helping the US to support
pro-Western regimes within Africa and has contributed troops to US led military
operations in Kuwait during the early 1990's (Zunes, 1998).
This special relationship between Morocco and the US helped turn the tide
of the war in Morocco’s favor, and therefore changed King Hassan’s openminded outlook towards peace and mediation (Naldi, 1985) Morocco’s newfound
leverage on the battlefield has translated into leverage at the bargaining table.

A War Over Resources?
Offering an additional financial impediment is Western Sahara’s wealth of
resources and the resulting dividends they paid to the owner of that land.
Though Morocco and Mauritania have expressed ethical or historical possession
of Western Sahara, the amount of economic advantage it offers questions the
legitimacy of these countries’ historical and ethical claims.
The Western Saharan coastline has some of the largest fisheries in the
world. Furthermore, its oil deposits, iron ore mines, and its huge phosphate
deposits can offer the host country a large economic bounty (Hodges, 1984).
With 10 billion tons of phosphate and 1.7 billion tons of high-grade ore, the
phosphate proceeds could ensure Western Sahara’s place as the second largest
phosphate exporter next to Morocco. Consequently, it could single-handedly
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support Western Sahara’s small population, offering it the opportunity to have a
per capita income equivalent to Western Europe. However, exportation of oar
collapsed shortly after war broke out in the region (Hodges, 1984).
The AU’s difficulties with financing peacemaking and peacekeeping
operations stems from an AU track record that has dissuaded member states
from contributing to the AU Peace Fund. In light of this, it becomes increasingly
difficult to engage in peacemaking and peacekeeping activities when the warring
parties are the well-financed Moroccan Government and the formidable Polisario
Front. These financial issues are further compounded by the irreconcilable
differences between the warring parties driven (in part) by economic gain offered
by Western Sahara’s natural resources.

Political Impediments
The AU did achieve an agreement for a ceasefire and referendum by King
Hassan II of Morocco. However, these efforts were slowed by the AU’s
inexperience with successful administration of referenda in other areas in Africa
and the growing rift between AU members regarding SADR membership to the
AU in 1984 (MINURSO, 2007). Morocco’s lack of commitment to negotiate with
the Polisario Front created a political atmosphere that provided an uphill battle for
the AU and UN to facilitate peacemaking operations. It was not until 1991 that a
ceasefire was agreed upon by the Polisario Front in exchange for the referendum
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for their sovereignty. The Moroccan Government has yet to grant and administer
any such vote (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995).

Loophole in International Law
Part of the difficulty with peacemaking and peacekeeping operations is the
fact that the intervening force is to respect the sovereignty of the host country.
Despite the UN and AU rejection of Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara,
they still allow Morocco to include the region within its sphere of sovereignty.
This presents a conflict of interest, as seen in Darfur, because the government—
the perpetrator of the offenses—denies the international community access to
engage in peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavors (Naldi, 1985). This is a
major impediment to the establishment of peacemaking and peacekeeping forces
within Western Sahara. In addition, the lack of access was initially an
impediment to holding a referendum for self-determination (Zunes, 2007). Many
expect that the Polisario Front’s patience will run short as they continue the
ceasefire in exchange for a referendum that has yet to come (Thorne, April
2007).

SADR Admission to AU: A Shot in the Arm or a Shot in the Foot?
In 1980, SADR first applied for membership to the AU citing Article 28,
which states that “any sovereign African State may at any time notify the
Administrative Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede to [the AU]
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charter” (as cited in Naldi, 1982, p. 152). Morocco’s main contention to this
request for membership came from the wording of this quote which states that
SADR did not qualify as a sovereign “state” per se, and therefore was not eligible
for membership despite SADR’s recognition of statehood by 35 other African
countries (Naldi, 1982). SADR was invited in accordance with the AU Charter to
join the proceedings; however, a simple majority at a previous meeting in Tripoli
already decided SADR’s admission into the AU. Further illustrating the AU’s
division on the issue, Morocco and 19 other allied states sat out of the meeting,
thus preventing a two-thirds quorum. This did not stop admission of the SADR to
the AU, which resulted in Moroccan withdrawal of its membership from the AU in
protest (Hodges, 1984).
The AU attempted many times to reach a compromise between SADR
and Morocco as a means of demonstrating its moderate position towards the
Western Sahara conflict. Nevertheless, by granting admission of SADR
membership, the AU alienated the Moroccan Government while simultaneously
allowing it to become a political statement, thus polarizing its members on the
issue. Because the nature of the dispute is centered on the Saharawis' right to
sovereignty, this maneuver completely undermined the AU’s positioning as an
objective party in the peacekeeping process between Morocco and the Polisario
Front. As Naldi (1985) notes, “SADR’s admission as an [AU] member has
seriously undermined the prospect of further Moroccan cooperation with the
Implementation Committee” (p. 600).
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Socio-Cultural Issues
Self-determination is a key issue within the peace process of this case.
The conflict started with the Saharawis people claiming they were an ethnically
distinct people prior to Spanish acquisition and therefore should be granted selfdetermination immediately after Spanish decolonization. This claim is best
upheld within the ICJ and is maintained by the difficulty to produce a referendum
for self-determination.

A Case for the International Court of Justice
Because the central question of this conflict is based on the legitimacy of
the Moroccan claim to the region of Western Sahara, a survey of the ICJ’s ruling
on this matter is important to establish credence to the Saharawis’ claim to selfdetermination within the international community.
After decolonization of Western Sahara, it the AU requires that the territory
be returned to the country from which it was taken. Both Morocco and
Mauritania laid claim to the Western Sahara region. This resulted in the ruling of
the ICJ in 1974 (Okere, 1979).
In this dispute, there were three questions to be answered that would
determine the fate of Western Sahara: Was Western Sahara a land of no
national allegiance? Morocco argued that because indigenous clans of the
region displayed loyalty to Moroccan royalty at time of colonization, they were
therefore granted possession of the land via “immemorial possession” (Okere,
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1979, p. 307) as well as by “geographic contiguity” (ibid, p.307). Mauritania,
however, claimed that even though it was not a state at the time of Spanish
colonization, it was still a region of peoples tethered by a common culture and
social structure, which included the Western Sahara region. The court found that
Western Sahara was not terra nullius (territory belonging to no one) which led
them to the second and third questions. On the Moroccan legal claim of the
territory, the court found that:
In the absence of…proof of unambiguous and continued display of
authority [on part of the Western Saharan clans], the Court found that
there were not ties of territorial sovereignty but only legal links arising from
personal allegiance by some nomadic tribes—more out of religious loyalty
or expediency than from a feeling of obligation (emphasis added).
(Okere, 1979, p. 310)
In addition to not finding any legal connection between Morocco and Western
Sahara, the court also found that no legal connection between Western Sahara
and the Mauritania entity (Okere, 1979). Despite the ICJ advisory decision with a
15-1 vote to uphold Saharawis self-determination, it offered little help in settling
the dispute.

The Elusive Referendum
Because of the abounding international recognition of Western Sahara’s
right to self-determination, the AU had been attempting to gain a ceasefire and
referendum 12 years prior to the 1991 UN brokered agreement (MINURSO,
2007). Crucial to achieving the ceasefire was the promise to the Saharawis
people and their Polisario Front that a referendum vote for self-determination
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would occur. Despite several attempts this has yet to happen. Because the
region is largely comprised of the Saharawis population, it is clear that the
referendum would surely result in Western Saharan independence and the
legitimization of SADR.
According to the UN Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara
(MINURSO) timeline (MINURSO, 2007), the UN and AU began mediation
discussions with Western Sahara and Morocco by first proposing the ceasefirereferendum negotiations in 1979. This attempt, however, was rejected by
Morocco. By 1981, King Hassan II expressed a willingness to hold a
referendum; however, he still qualified that willingness with a statement regarding
Morocco’s “historical claims” to the territory. As explained earlier, the following
year marked the SADR’s admission into the AU and Morocco’s response of a
suspension and eventual withdrawal from the Union in 1984, widening the
political rift between the AU and Morocco.
In 1984, the UN and AU collaborated to present the “Settlement
Proposals” to the warring parties in 1985 as a solution to the conflict. Six years
later these proposals were adopted by the Security Council (April 19, 1991) and
became known as the “Settlement Plan.” MINURSO was created in 1991
pursuant to Security Council resolution S/1991/690 and was directed to oversee
and conduct the referendum in conjunction with the AU.
Immediately after establishing a referendum timetable, arguments arose
as to who would qualify for voting rights. Seddon (1992) notes of a plan outlined
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in the UN Secretary’s draft report that included voters whose fathers were born in
the area and those who had intermittently lived in the region before December of
1974. This plan added 30,000 voters to the qualifying pool who may or may not
live in the region. Seddon further notes:
The report received the backing of the US and France—staunch and longtime supporters of the Moroccan regime and its position on the Western
Sahara. But it drew strong criticism from a number of non-aligned states
as well as from the [AU], which includes the Saharan Arab Democratic
Republic as a member state and which, with the UN, co-sponsored the
peace plan. The Polisario Front called the report, ‘partial, unjust and
completely aligned with the position of the aggressor, the Moroccan
colonists.
(p. 103)
As seen here, division between Moroccan and Polisario interests have infected
the UN and AU’s outlook towards the conflict. Furthermore, the dichotomy
between Moroccan and Saharawis interests continue to widen as they attempt to
establish a list of qualified voters. By 1999, the first Provisional Voters List (PVL)
was published to survey the qualified voters. This list was followed by a number
of appeals which led to a second PVL. This second list states that out of the
250,000 Saharans identified, 86,425 voters are deemed eligible to vote.
The two PVLs were a result to conflicting opinions over the relevance of
the date of a voter census. Where Morocco believed that the 1974 census
should be a mere point of reference for producing a voter list, the Polisario Front
believed that the 1974 census should be the “sole basis for the application of the
criteria for voter eligibility” (UN Resolution 809, 1993).
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The disenfranchisement of two-thirds of the population triggered 131,000
appeals filed against the PVL (MINURSO, 2007). While the Saharawis wish to
be fairly represented in the fate-changing referendum, Morocco is still unwilling to
agree to any referendum that incorporates more of the population than previously
agreed. Despite an extension of the referendum deadline to July of 2000
(Seddon, 2000), there has yet to be one (UN List of Operations, 2008a).4

Conclusion
The Western Saharan stalemate continues today with Morocco and the
Polisario Front stalemated over irreconcilable differences. The UN and AU face
a difficult mission to maintain a ceasefire based upon the promise of a
referendum that has yet to come. The financial impediments represented by a
strong Moroccan-US relationship, an irresistible bounty of natural resources, and
a lack of peacemaking and peacekeeping financing for the AU has allowed the
continuance of the conflict. Morocco’s ability to maintain a formidable military
front against the Polisario Front has further emboldened their position against
negotiation for the referendum. Furthermore, a combination of political snafus as
well as a reputation for poorly executed peacemaking missions have further
impeded upon peacekeeping efforts in this case and explains why the Moroccan

4

The most current date shown on the UN List of Operations is 2008. MINURSO is still listed
ongoing as of that date. Because I cannot find any sources between December 2008 and March
2009 stating the mission’s completion, I am left to assume that efforts to conduct a referendum in
Western Sahara are ongoing.
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Government and the Polisario Front have been at a stalemate for 17 years
(United States Department of State, 2009).
Though the AU did achieve a ceasefire agreement in 1991, they did
require the UN’s help to do it. According to a MINURSO timeline (MINURSO,
2007), UN participation did not come to the fore until after SADR’s admission to
the AU and the resulting revocation of Moroccan’s AU membership (Pazzanita,
1994). AU peacemaking and peacekeeping efficacy is lacking due to the inability
to fund a viable peacemaking force. Furthermore, the financial impediments to
efficacy are compounded by the AU’s loss of objectivity and trust with one of the
parties with whom negotiations are to take part. The dissolving trust between the
AU and Morocco, Morocco’s longstanding relationship with the US, and the US
influence within the UN may also explain Morocco’s openness to UN led
negotiations.
What implications for the AU result from the dichotomy between the
stalemate of Western Sahara and the crisis of Darfur have for the African Union?
The answer is discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4: Comparison and Conclusion

At present, both Darfur and Western Sahara are no further along than they
were in years past. Lack of mutual trust between Khartoum and Darfur rebel
groups still exist, leaving little room for fruitful negotiation or quality ceasefire
(Sudan Tribune, May 2009). The recent indictment of al Bashir has shown some
movement towards relieving one of the political impediments. However, the
announcement of the indictment has already proven counter-productive; al
Bashir’s loyalists are not likely to give him up without a fight nor will angering the
emboldened leader help humanitarian efforts any in the region. To the West,
Western Sahara is still locked in a stalemate with little word on when the
promised referendum will occur. As a symptom of this, MINURSO has been
extended yet again until April 2010 (UN, 2009).

Comparison of Overarching Trends
These case studies illuminate the financial, political, and socio-cultural
trials the AU must face when engaging in peacemaking and peacekeeping.
While each study illuminates the AU’s consistent need for UN assistance with
66

their peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives, further observation of these
trends demonstrates their transcendence from the case studies themselves,
offering a deeper insight into the peacemaking and peacekeeping shortcomings
within the AU itself.
Each case study offers insight to the AU’s difficulty in funding
peacemaking operations. First, the AU alone has difficulty meeting the logistical
goals necessary for the scale of its peacemaking and peacekeeping missions.
Further exacerbating this issue are the military and logistic capabilities of
governments who oppose AU initiatives for peace. While the AU relies on
voluntary contributions from member states and the international community,
both Sudanese oil revenue and Moroccan phosphate profit continue to fund each
nation-state’s military initiatives.
Furthermore, the will of these states to use alliances to openly oppose the
AU in favor of their own interests demonstrates political challenges as well. Both
the Darfur and the Western Sahara cases demonstrate the AU’s inability to
compete with international allies who are economically strong and politically
powerful. While Darfur enjoys a financial alliance with China, Morocco’s longstanding political alliance with the US further complicates the negotiations
process. Additionally, the Moroccan case demonstrates the fragility of the AU
alliance which undermines its ability to fund peace missions and negotiate with a
unified voice. Therefore, not only is the AU proving inept in funding its own
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peacemaking and peacekeeping missions, their opponents are proving to out
fund and out gun the AU as well.
The last over-arching impediment to AU peacemaking and peacekeeping
is the overwhelming diversity of the continent. These two case studies illustrate
conflict fuelled by socio-cultural rivalry. While the symptoms of these conflicts
are socio-cultural by nature, experts in the field disagree on how it is to be
addressed.
In summary, these case studies demonstrate that the AU’s membership is
much too large, and its goals are too grand to financed and completed on a
continental scale. Its inability to finance peace missions combined with memberstates’ cavalier attitude toward AU policies diminishes the organization’s viability
in peacemaking and peacekeeping.

Suggestions for the Future
If the AU is to salvage any peacekeeping validity, some changes ought to
be considered. First, the AU must start peacekeeping with international support,
rather than requiring it later. This partnership could use the colonialist attitude
many African dictators take towards international aid and use it to their
advantage, creating a “good-cop, bad-cop” dichotomy. However this partnership
is spun, the AU must frame their peacekeeping endeavors with international
partnership in mind given the effects great nations have on the outcome of
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peacekeeping missions. For example, the US’s help in Sudan is producing
progress in humanitarian aid as well as furthering negotiations, whereas the US’s
clear support of Moroccan interests produce hindrances at the Western Saharan
negotiations table.
Second, a shortage of funds prevents the AU from producing a substantial
peacekeeping mission. This reality therefore prescribes the AU to investigate
more economically efficient means of attaining peace. As mentioned in chapter 1
of this thesis, mediation has proven promising in this regard as has peacebuilding and preventative diplomacy.
Third, for regionalism to take hold there must be some economic
interdependency. African peace in this vain requires the AU membership to
maintain the development of infrastructure and economic interdependency
between members. However, a large caveat to this is infrastructure in Africa
most likely originates from foreign investment overseas. This requires AU
membership to be economically dependent upon foreign investment rather than
being interdependent upon each other.
Finally, if a sub-regional organization has a better understanding of
regional and cultural issues, then this could potentially lead to better
peacekeeping operations vis-à-vis sub-regional advisory (e.g. ECOWAS).
However, given the conflicting needs, interests, and opinions of the member
states that have joint membership to the AU as well as to sub-regional
organizations, the path to peace may be stymied by organizational conflict of
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interest, leading to distrust. Since regionalism requires the AU membership to
relinquish their sovereignty to the organization, then this organization is only as
strong as the mutual trust of its members.

Regionalism for Peacekeeping?
The socio-cultural divisions represented by the Darfur and Western
Sahara conflicts reflect the most fundamental impediment towards peace
achieved by regionalism. The economic interdependence which led to the EU
success story was only possible with an economic partnership founded upon a
mutual trust and distaste for conflict amongst the parties involved. Following the
European example, political integration flows from this economic
interdependence while peace proliferates from a fundamental economic
dependency the aggressor has upon the opponent, forcing a political solution.
The development of the AU from the large OAU seems to be developing in
reverse from that of the EU. While the EU started with 6 countries and grew over
time, the AU incorporated 47 countries at its start. Furthermore, while the EU
developed through economic interdependence and integrated politically overtime,
the AU seems to be starting with a political union while expecting economic
development to occur simultaneously. These two case studies clearly illustrate
that this simultaneous progression is counterproductive as socio-cultural
cleavages prevent any economic interdependence, further preventing political
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integration. Therefore, if socio-cultural upheaval must be absent as a
prerequisite for economic interdependence and political integration, then the AU
experience demonstrates that regionalism cannot be implemented as a platform
for peacekeeping, but rather is a tool for perpetuating an existing peace.
In conclusion, the case studies of Darfur and Western Sahara suggest that
while socio-cultural conflict continues to proliferate, the AU has neither the
financial resources nor the political clout to meet peacemaking and
peacekeeping milestones. Furthermore, findings suggest that conflict founded
upon socio-cultural diversity undermines the very foundation of regionalism
solidarity. Therefore, this conflict compromises the overall application of
regionalism as a mechanism for peacekeeping. All of these impediments work in
concert to stymie the AU from becoming internationally respected for making and
keeping the peace.
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